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Given the number of organizations present, GridEx estimates that more than 28,000 individual players participated, including utility workers and government partners, an all-time high since the exercise began. Called GridEx, the exercise was hosted by the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC) from 18 to 20 November 2025, and was described in a report released on 2 March. Aspects include emergency exercises, such as NERC\u2019s biannual GridEx program. The Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council (ESCC) is the liaison between the electric power industry and the federal government, and it is responsible for preparing for and responding to threats and disasters.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
Devices capable of subjecting transformers and other critical infrastructure to localized, but destructive, levels of EMP can be built from readily available equipment from local electronics stores and instructions from the internet. The utilities industry has done an excellent job of ensuring our electric reliability. Last year, when the Department of Energy announced $45 million of funding for energy sector security, it chose to distribute a chunk of that money to a research project focused on preventing cyber-physical threats to distributed energy resources (DER) using zero-trust authentication. Bramson tells Dark Reading that “the gap comes from having more than one team owning cybersecurity, and the potential opportunity for assumptions of ‘the other side’ covering some aspect of the system.” IT and OT might involve different machinery, but ever since cyber-physical attacks rose to prominence in the late 2000s and 2010s, the considerations of each have affected both. On the physical attack front, in February 2023, the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC) disclosed that physical attacks on the power grid had risen a full 71% in 2022 (and 20% over 2020 numbers).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
As the grid evolves through digitization, IoT expansion, and increased automation, so does its exposure to cyber and physical threats. The Ukraine 2015 power grid attacks showcased how attackers can remotely control circuit breakers while disabling operator visibility and response capabilities. It includes an interconnected network of substations, transmission lines, https:\/\/orwell.ru\/test\/web\/<\/a> control systems, and intelligent devices that work together to keep electricity flowing reliably. The power grid has become one of the most complex systems and infrastructures ever designed.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Centralized platforms support cultural transformation by offering visibility tools built for OT teams, presenting alerts, compliance drift, and access violations in language and context relevant to field personnel. Finally, CISA 2015 set up policies and procedures for voluntary sharing of cybersecurity threat information between and among the federal government and private entities (the definition of which includes public power utilities) and provides limited liability protection for these activities. While not all data is publicly available, Coe says there\u2019s been a \u201ctenfold\u201d increase over the past decade in the number of reported physical attacks on the grid. This scenario, inspired by the upcoming 2026 World Cup and the 2028 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, was an exercise in studying how utilities can prevent and mitigate, among other dangers, physical attacks on power grids. The bill includes a number of provisions to establish a more transparent and streamlined process by which the President, the Department of Energy, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) can act to address existing or potential vulnerabilities.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n While it is evident that technology alone cannot secure the grid, it must be coupled with a strong security-first culture, ongoing training, https:\/\/www.softcourier.com\/list.php?cat=System%20Utilities%3A%3ASystem%20Maintenance&page=58<\/a> and cross-disciplinary collaboration between engineers, operators, and security teams. Ensure that only vendors with secure firmware update processes are engaged. Automated monitoring dashboards provide real-time visibility into device vulnerabilities, firmware versions, and patch status, helping utilities detect risks early and streamline remediation. Organizations should leverage automations for continuous visibility within distributed environments and rapid detection of abnormal activity such as unauthorized access, firmware tampering, or communication anomalies. Centralized dashboards consolidate visibility across sites, devices, and compliance status, supporting a Defense-in-Depth approach to grid security. Organizations should deploy asset discovery tools to build a live inventory, use platforms that integrate with SCADA to surface device status, firmware versions, and create a layered defense.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
How Secure Is America\u2019s Power Grid? Are We Doing Enough to Protect It Against an Attack?<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n
Power grid exposure points and threat landscape<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n